الصفحة 1
الصفحة 1
From Walras to Pareto
In this thought-provoking collection, ten international scholars offer reflections and new interpretations of Walras’and Pareto’s unique contributions to topics as broad as the over-arching important of the social sciences, the development of modern microeconomics and (in particular) econometrics, political economy and public choice, and political sociology. Their insights will be of particular interest to researchers and scholars of economic history, political sociology, and the social sciences.
Differential Information Economies
One of the main problems in current economic theory is to write contracts which are Pareto optimal, incentive compatible, and also implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a dynamic, noncooperative game. The question arises whether it is possible to provide Walrasian type or cooperative equilibrium concepts which have these properties. This volume contains original contributions on noncooperative and cooperative equilibrium notions in economies with differential information and provides answers to the above questions. Moreover, issues of stability, learning and continuity of alternative equilibria are also examined.
