الصفحة 1
الصفحة 1
New Political Economy of Exchange Rate Policies and the Enlargement of the Eurozone
This work examines the political economy of exchange-rate policies in the context of the eastward enlargement of the eurozone. The analysis shows that prospective members of the EMU are likely to pass on some of the incurred Maastricht costs of convergence to the current EMU-members. The transmission mechanism is an altered exchange-rate policy that is carried out utilizing a "threaten-thy-neighbour"-strategy. The nature of the arising conflict between current and prospective EMU-members originates from both parties' admitted inclination to complete the enlargement process, complicated by their disinclination to bear the costs. The ensuing moral-hazard behaviour of the CEECs proves to be one of brinkmanship.
Negotiation agent
Negor is an eCommerce AI chatbot that increases sales by engaging with the user much like a salesperson when you walk into a store. This conversational eCommerce approach allows companies to overcome sales obstacles, recommend products for cross- or up-sells, and reduce support tickets all while being available 24/7. E-commerce is a way to make the customers' buying experience more seamless and interactive while helping to offer bargaining features, which are familiar in traditional stores. In addition, the Chatbot is used to negotiate the best price for the customer and the best deal for the seller.
Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games
This book systematically presents the main solutions of cooperative games: the core, bargaining set, kernel, nucleolus, and the Shapley value of TU games, and the core, the Shapley value, and the ordinal bargaining set of NTU games. To each solution the authors devote a separate chapter wherein they study its properties in full detail. Moreover, important variants are defined or even intensively analyzed. The authors also investigate in separate chapters continuity, dynamics, and geometric properties of solutions of TU games. The study culminates in uniform and coherent axiomatizations of all the foregoing solutions (excluding the bargaining set). Such axiomatizations have not appeared in any book. Moreover, the book contains a detailed analysis of the main results on cooperative games without side payments. Such analysis is very limited or non-existent in other books on game theory.
Game Theory : A Multi-Leveled Approach
This book presents the basics of game theory both on an undergraduate level and on a more advanced mathematical level. It covers most topics of interest in game theory, including cooperative game theory. Part I presents introductions to all these topics on a basic yet formally precise level. It includes chapters on repeated games, social choice theory, and selected topics such as bargaining theory, exchange economies, and matching. Part II goes deeper into noncooperative theory and treats the theory of zerosum games, refinements of Nash equilibrium in strategic as well as extensive form games, and evolutionary games. Part III covers basic concepts in the theory of transferable utility games, such as core and balancedness, Shapley value and variations, and nucleolus. Some mathematical tools on duality and convexity are collected in Part IV. Every chapter in the book concludes with a problem section. Hints, answers and solutions are included.
Dynamic Modeling of Monetary and Fiscal Cooperation Among Nations
The first four chapters introduce the reader to the dynamics of fiscal and monetary policy cooperation. Issues covered include: fiscal coordination, fiscal stringency requirements, structural and bargaining power asymmetries and the design of monetary and fiscal policymaking in a monetary union. In the four last chapters multiple-player settings with aspects of fiscal and/or monetary coordination are analyzed using the endogenous coalition formation approach. The analysis is focused on shock and model asymmetries and issues of multi-country coordination in the presence of (possibly many) monetary unions.
Differential Information Economies
One of the main problems in current economic theory is to write contracts which are Pareto optimal, incentive compatible, and also implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a dynamic, noncooperative game. The question arises whether it is possible to provide Walrasian type or cooperative equilibrium concepts which have these properties. This volume contains original contributions on noncooperative and cooperative equilibrium notions in economies with differential information and provides answers to the above questions. Moreover, issues of stability, learning and continuity of alternative equilibria are also examined.
Collective Bargaining and Wage Formation; Performance and Challenges
This volume considers the development of the wage formation and wage bargaining institutions as a response to changes in the bargaining environment. These changes include a lower level of inflation and the growth in intraindustrial trade as firms have become more specialised. The response to these changes will depend on the current institutions and on the characteristics of the bargaining system. Generally there has been some move towards decentralisation; the question is what should be bargained centrally and which issues should be transferred to lower levels. Some of the contributions pay special attention to Nordic regimes using survey results gathered from the Finnish labour market partners.
Bargaining Power Effects in Financial Contracting : A Joint Analysis of Contract Type and Placement Mode Choices
The aim of this dissertation is to examine bargaining power effects in financial contracting. In particular power effects on firms' choices of contract type (debt vs. equity) and placement mode (public offering vs. private placement)
