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Dynamic Modeling of Monetary and Fiscal Cooperation Among Nations
The first four chapters introduce the reader to the dynamics of fiscal and monetary policy cooperation. Issues covered include: fiscal coordination, fiscal stringency requirements, structural and bargaining power asymmetries and the design of monetary and fiscal policymaking in a monetary union. In the four last chapters multiple-player settings with aspects of fiscal and/or monetary coordination are analyzed using the endogenous coalition formation approach. The analysis is focused on shock and model asymmetries and issues of multi-country coordination in the presence of (possibly many) monetary unions.
Bargaining Power Effects in Financial Contracting : A Joint Analysis of Contract Type and Placement Mode Choices
The aim of this dissertation is to examine bargaining power effects in financial contracting. In particular power effects on firms' choices of contract type (debt vs. equity) and placement mode (public offering vs. private placement)
