الصفحة 1
الصفحة 1
Nonbayesian Decision Theory : Beliefs and Desires as Reasons for Action
This book aims to present an account of rational choice from a non-Bayesian point of view. Rational agents maximize subjective expected utility, but contrary to what is claimed by Bayesians, the author argues that utility and subjective probability should not be defined in terms of preferences over uncertain prospects. To some extent, the author’s non-Bayesian view gives a modern account of what decision theory could have been like, had decision theorists not entered the Bayesian path discovered by Ramsey, Savage, and Jeffrey. The author argues that traditional Bayesian decision theory is unavailing from an action-guiding perspective. For the deliberating Bayesian agent, the output of decision theory is not a set of preferences over alternative acts - these preferences are on the contrary used as input to the theory.
Evolution of Non-Expected Utility Preferences
The theory on the evolution of preferences deals with the endogenous formation of preference relations in strategic situations. In particular, we demonstrate that preferences which diverge from von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility may potentially prove to be successful under evolutionary pressures.
Conjoint measurement : Methods and applications
Covering developments in Conjoint Analysis, this book presents the theory and applications of this technique. It discusses: normative models that maximize return, extension of choice-based conjoint simulations, latent class, hierarchical Bayes modelling, choice simulators, and normative models for representing competitive actions and reactions.
